Opinion: UBC SkyTrain must be Metro Vancouver's next public transit priority

B.C. government completes first series of soil sample drilling for UBC SkyTrain planning

BC government confirms UBC SkyTrain extension to be a key priority

Broadway Subway stations begin to take shape for 2027 opening

Opinion: Don't waste time and money on BRT or LRT, begin planning for North Shore-Metrotown SkyTrain

Jericho Lands development passes new hurdle to help First Nations secure construction financing

How many people will ride the Broadway Subway when it opens in 2027?

How TransLink bus routes could change from Broadway subway opening

Some see this extension merely as a service just for a post-secondary institution, but let us be clear: UBC is an economic powerhouse. The university’s Vancouver campus has a “daytime population” of over 80,000 people, including more than 55,000 students, and tens of thousands of faculty and staff.

UBC is a regional destination. Extending SkyTrain to the campus does not merely serve Vancouver; it delivers wide-reaching benefits across Metro Vancouver. The university draws students, faculty, staff, and visitors from every corner of the region, and improving access supports the entire public transit network.

When it comes to transportation and economic value, municipal borders — especially in a metropolitan region as geographically tiny as Metro Vancouver — are arbitrary and imaginary lines; the value and impact of this project transcends those boundaries and local politics.

Although the UBC campus and the surrounding University Endowment Lands (UEL) do not carry a “Town Centre” designation under Metro Vancouver Regional District’s regional land use plans, they effectively function as one. It officially carries a lower tier classification of a “Frequent Transit Development Area” — albeit the most important in the region by far — but some consideration should be given to elevating UBC’s designation as a Town Centre given its significance.

While building more student housing at or near UBC is undeniably important, it is not a substitute for extending SkyTrain to the campus. The demand for a SkyTrain extension is not solely driven by student commuting needs. Public transit and housing are not either-or choices; they must work together. Even with expanded on-campus housing, the ridership demand and regional connectivity benefits of a SkyTrain to UBC remain overwhelming and well justified.

And even with students benefiting from the discounted U-Pass, the demand for SkyTrain to UBC remains undeniable. The U-Pass has not only boosted short-term ridership (the duration of a student’s studies), but also helped shape generations of lifelong transit users. Extending subways to major university campuses is the norm in other major regions — Seattle’s Link LRT extension to the University of Washington in 2016 nearly doubled system-wide ridership, while Toronto’s Line 1 subway was extended to York University in 2017 to serve similar demand.

The hardest-working bus: 99 B-Line

Moreover, after nearly three decades of the 99 B-Line, the need for a high-capacity, rapid transit solution is backed by years of sustained, proven demand. One of the clearest signals for where to invest in serious public transit infrastructure is where ridership is already showing up — and few corridors in Metro Vancouver demonstrate that more clearly than the Central Broadway-UBC route.

Since the pandemic, as previously noted by TransLink, some of the 99 B-Line’s ridership has also been transplanted onto the 2020-launched R4 41st Avenue RapidBus — running between SkyTrain’s Expo Line’s Joyce-Collingwood Station and UBC along 41st Avenue. Similar to the 99 B-Line’s offering as a frequent, limited-stop, crosstown bus service, the R4 RapidBus has quickly ascended into becoming TransLink’s second busiest bus route, just behind the 99 B-Line.

It is no coincidence that TransLink’s third and fourth busiest bus routes also directly serve UBC — the east-west, crosstown routes of the No. 49 Metrotown/UBC on 49th Avenue and the No. 25 Brentwood Station/UBC on King Edward Avenue, respectively.

The 99 B-Line has long operated as one of the busiest bus routes in Canada and the United States, if not the busiest, routinely running at capacity and leaving riders behind at peak times.

In fact, there is already sufficient existing demand to justify the SkyTrain extension to UBC — demand that would only grow with the exponentially higher transit ridership expected once rapid transit reaches the campus. This major investment would be further amplified by high-density, transit-oriented development, such as the Jericho Lands project and ongoing densification at UBC and within the University Endowment Lands. Together, these initiatives would not only support new housing and economic opportunities, but also reinforce long-term ridership growth and the overall effectiveness of the regional transit network.

By contrast, focusing major public transit expansion in areas currently with relatively little ridership — in hopes of shaping future growth — can be risky and slow to pay off. While it is important to build for the future on a case-by-case basis, generally the most effective rapid transit planning strikes a balance that responds to existing demand and enables well-managed growth.

Millennium Line’s full potential depends on UBC

Ignoring the clear need completely in favour of unproven potential not only leaves loyal public transit riders — where people already rely on public transit, and have been for years — underserved, but also weakens public trust in long-term transportation planning.

It can weaken public and political support for future SkyTrain extension projects.

That was the case with the original Millennium Line, which consistently underperformed in ridership throughout the 2000s. The purpose-built Millennium Line segments that opened in 2002 — running through East Vancouver, Burnaby, southwest Coquitlam, and New Westminster — primarily traversed industrial lands with inherently lower ridership potential. However, this has changed in recent years, particularly in Burnaby, where major high-density residential developments have significantly boosted ridership and transformed the Lougheed Highway corridor’s urban character.

The Millennium Line’s initially low ridership — well below forecasts — played a partial role in the political indecision and infighting among regional municipal leaders over whether to proceed with the Canada Line. In the 2000s, some decision-makers argued that the Canada Line would never reach its projected ridership, claiming that if such demand truly existed, it would already be visible on existing bus routes.

Some local leaders also championed the idea that enhanced bus services or street-level light rail transit (LRT) could deliver the same outcomes at a lower cost — arguments that underestimated the long-term benefits and ridership potential of fully grade-separated rapid transit. Only fully grade-separated systems like SkyTrain can offer the speed, frequency, reliability, and reduced travel times needed to make public transit truly competitive with driving. Political constraints on funding further contributed to the Canada Line’s under-built design, with a tight budget limiting station sizes and overall capacity.

The original plan for the Millennium Line envisioned both eastern and western extensions being built relatively shortly after the line’s initial launch in 2002. The eastern extension — from Lougheed Town Centre Station to Coquitlam City Centre — was eventually realized in 2016 as the Evergreen extension. The western extension, originally intended to reach Cambie Street or Granville Street in Vancouver, stalled for years. Now known as the Broadway extension, this long-delayed segment is finally under construction, extending the Millennium Line further west to Arbutus Street — where the future UBC extension would begin.

The Millennium Line’s historically lower ridership below original forecasts is largely a result of the line being only partially built. Its key extensions into the Central Broadway corridor and the Tri-Cities were delayed, as provincial and regional focus shifted toward advancing the Canada Line — a project that also carried strong merit — in time for the 2010 Winter Olympics. While the Canada Line’s value was undeniable, and it has ultimately transformed the region’s public transit system, the Millennium Line’s full ridership potential was not more quickly realized due to its truncated alignment and the deferral of its most critical segments, especially the busy segment serving Vancouver’s Central Broadway corridor.

And for political reasons — namely, a prior commitment to municipalities in the Tri-Cities that they would be next in line for rail rapid transit investment following the Canada Line — the Evergreen extension was prioritized in the 2010s. This came at the expense of the Broadway extension, a project with significantly greater merit and exponentially higher ridership potential.

The longer we wait, the higher the cost of an inevitable project

But the longer we wait, the more expensive such infrastructure projects become.

Every year of delay also adds to the opportunity costs to connect people to education, housing, and jobs in a far quicker and more productive way.

In particular for project implementation, construction costs have risen substantially, especially in more recent years, and land acquisitions and related costs are also trending upward.

In 1999, a preliminary technical study jointly supported by the provincial government, TransLink, and the City of Vancouver estimated the Broadway extension reaching Arbutus Street would cost approximately $700 million — roughly $1.2 billion in 2025 dollars when adjusted for inflation.

Ahead of the controversial public transit plebiscite a decade ago, the estimated cost of the Broadway extension to Arbutus Street was pegged at about $2.1 billion — approximately $2.7 billion in 2025 dollars.

When the 5.7-km-long, six-station Broadway extension reaches completion and opens in Fall 2027, temporarily bringing the Millennium Line’s westernmost terminus to the new Arbutus Station (until the line is further extended to UBC), the total cost will ultimately reach $2.954 billion — two and a half times the estimate made a quarter century ago.

It is conceivable that if provincial and municipal leaders back in the day had more foresight, we could have accomplished the entire Millennium Line extension reaching UBC for a total price that is less than the current project’s total cost of going halfway to Arbutus Station, with inflation also accounted for.

According to the provincial government’s ridership forecasts, the Broadway extension to Arbutus Street is expected to see between 135,000 and 150,000 boardings per day upon opening. That figure is projected to grow to between 143,000 and 163,000 daily boardings by 2030. By 2045, ridership is forecast to reach between 167,000 and 191,000 boardings per day — a projection that assumes the extension to UBC will be completed by that time.

A previous preliminary TransLink study also estimated that the entire 12-km-long Millennium Line extension between VCC-Clark Station and UBC could see up to about 320,000 boardings per day by 2041.

And these forecasts do not fully take into account the latest densification policies enabled by the provincial and municipal governments, including the City of Vancouver’s Broadway Plan and future area plans along the corridor to UBC, as well as the Jericho Lands project and the continued growth of UBC and the UEL.

For comparison, in June 2025, according to TransLink, the combined average weekday boardings for the Expo, Millennium, and Canada lines were about 460,000 per day, including 330,000 for the combined Expo and Millennium lines system and 130,000 for the Canada Line.

For further context, when the 19-km-long Canada Line first opened in 2009, it saw an average of just over 80,000 boardings per day for its first year of operations, and it subsequently quickly reached and exceeded 100,000 boardings per day, years ahead of schedule — something that critics previously thought would be impossible.

In 2019, three years after opening, the 11-km-long Evergreen extension’s ridership was tracking at just under 40,000 boardings per day.

When it opens in 2029, the 16-km-long Surrey-Langley extension of the Expo Line will see about 56,000 boardings per day, growing to 80,000 by 2050.

With these figures established for comparison, a very strong argument can likely be made that the Millennium Line’s westward extension all the way to UBC should be very high up in the pedestal of priorities.

UBC SkyTrain is a part of the region’s arterial transit backbone

SkyTrain’s speedy travel times — coupled with high frequencies — propel these ridership projections. These travel times are highly competitive with not only existing bus services but also private vehicle driving times.

With a seamless, transfer-free, one-train ride on the Millennium Line from its easternmost terminus at Lafarge Lake-Douglas Station in Coquitlam City Centre, it would take approximately one hour to reach UBC. Travel times from UBC to key points along the Millennium Line are also extremely efficient — about 10 minutes to Arbutus Station, 15 minutes to Broadway-City Hall Station for Canada Line connections, and 20 minutes to Commercial-Broadway Station for Expo Line connections.

These travel times highlight the superior convenience and regional connectivity that a fully extended Millennium Line to UBC would provide.

The network multiplier effect in the context of a metro rail system like SkyTrain refers to the phenomenon where each new line extension added to the network increases the value and utility of the entire system, leading to exponential — not linear — ridership growth.

As SkyTrain expands, it connects more people to more destinations with greater convenience, which in turn attracts more riders. But the impact is not limited to the new segment alone — the entire network benefits.

For example, a new SkyTrain extension may provide a faster, more reliable route for existing riders who previously relied on bus services or indirect connections. At the same time, it draws in new riders who were previously beyond the practical reach of the system. The result is higher ridership not just on the new line, but across the broader network due to improved connectivity, better transfer opportunities, and more competitive travel times.

Think of the spaghetti-like subway/metro rail maps of cities such as Tokyo, Shanghai, Hong Kong, Singapore, London, and Paris — complex at first glance, yet a testament to the comprehensive, interconnected networks that make getting around these cities remarkably efficient and intuitive. Their usability and reliability stem from the sheer depth of coverage, frequency, and redundancy built into the system — something Metro Vancouver should aspire to as it expands its own network, with SkyTrain.

This network multiplier effect growth was last strongly experienced with the Canada Line, and it will happen again for the Broadway extension to Arbutus Street in 2027. The impact would be far greater if the Millennium Line reached UBC. Both scenarios would be game-changing on a regional level.

Furthermore, previous ridership projections show the soon-to-be truncated 99 B-Line route between Arbutus Station and UBC would reach capacity during peak hours upon the Broadway extension’s opening.

During other times of the day, the truncated 99 B-Line will have enough capacity over the short- and medium-term, before it is completely overwhelmed by the growing number of transfers at Arbutus Station between the articulated buses and the Millennium Line. Overnight in 2027, upon the opening of the Broadway extension, Arbutus Station and Broadway-City Hall Station (interchange with the Canada Line) will become some of the SkyTrain network’s busiest stations.

Build for the region, not a jurisdiction

There is no question that the UBC SkyTrain extension’s cost will be significant — higher than the $2.954 billion currently being spent on bringing the Millennium Line mid-way, ending at Arbutus Street. But escalated costs are an unavoidable post-pandemic reality for any SkyTrain extension or infrastructure project moving forward.

The Surrey-Langley extension also saw its budget grow by 50 per cent to $6 billion, following the pandemic-induced inflationary cycle.

SkyTrain’s new operations and maintenance facility currently being built in Coquitlam near Braid Station — called OMC3 — will cost $1.3 billion.

A 21-km-long widening project of Highway 1 in the eastern end of the Lower Mainland will cost $5 billion.

And somehow, the Marpole Transit Centre bus depot in South Vancouver will cost $848 million.

Once again, that is why the UBC SkyTrain extension needs to be built sooner rather than later, as continued delays ultimately increase the construction costs.

Yet there is growing concern that, under political pressure, TransLink’s Mayors’ Council may sideline the UBC SkyTrain extension in favour of the emerging new Bus Rapid Transit (BRT) network strategy — all under the guise of “regional equity.”

While BRT absolutely has a place in the region — particularly for select corridors, on a case-by-case basis, with a more moderate demand — there is a great risk we are increasingly viewing this more optimized bus mode through rose-coloured glasses. This shift places a far greater emphasis on building a much broader network size at a lower cost, while diminishing the focus on quality of service.

Even with the best possible bus priority measures, BRT simply cannot match the speed, reliability, capacity, comfort, allure and long-term value of a fully grade-separated, automated rail system.

This difference is not just measurable — it is fundamental. There is simply no comparison. No amount of wishful thinking can substitute for the performance and permanence.

And let us not forget: the ideal bus priority conditions envisioned by TransLink — particularly the proposed strategy of implementing physically separated bus-only lanes (not to be confused with simple bus lanes regulated by signage and paint) along the majority of the BRT routes, except at intersections — are extremely difficult to achieve in Metro Vancouver.

If we are being honest with ourselves, we must acknowledge that this region is a major outlier in the North American context. Metro Vancouver, led by Vancouver’s efforts, made a deliberate decision in the 1960s and 1970s not to build an extensive freeway network.

Unlike many large Canadian and U.S. metropolitan areas with expansive freeway systems and wide arterial road networks, Metro Vancouver has very limited arterial road space to reallocate — especially in dense, built-up corridors where transportation demand is highest and public and political resistance to removing vehicle lanes is most entrenched. Some may dispute this reality, but it remains a fundamental constraint that challenges the feasibility of street-level rapid transit solutions, whether it be BRT or LRT. To suggest otherwise risks coming across as disingenuous and dismissive of the spatial and political challenges.

Progress and desired outcomes are best achieved through solutions that represent positive reinforcement — not by the overuse of negative reinforcement to downplay challenges or silence legitimate concerns.

In addition to extending SkyTrain to UBC, we should be proactively planning full SkyTrain buildouts for at least two other strategically important corridors — namely, the North Shore to Burnaby corridor (from Park Royal to Brentwood and Metrotown via the Second Narrows) and the King George Boulevard corridor (from Surrey City Centre to at least Newton). Concerningly, both of these critical corridors are envisioned as BRT lines.

These are not marginal corridors — they are essential arteries with strong ridership potential and long-term urban growth. Both corridors are crucial to further establish Metro Vancouver’s backbone rapid transit network of SkyTrain.

A SkyTrain line to the North Shore — long neglected despite its clearly revealed and latent demand — would finally offer a meaningful, high-capacity transportation solution, and an additional route across Burrard Inlet. A southward extension of the Expo Line along King George Boulevard would further reinforce Surrey City Centre and form the backbone of a rapidly growing urban corridor in Surrey, supporting both current needs and future development.

Similar to the sound rationale that led to the cancellation of the controversial street-level Surrey-Newton Guildford LRT, watering these two corridors down to BRT could risk building infrastructure that becomes obsolete or overwhelmed relatively quickly.

Not only are we poised to spend hundreds of millions — potentially approximately $1 billion — on just the first three BRT lines, but we also risk having to dismantle much of that infrastructure in the not-so-distant future to make way for SkyTrain. While some of the BRT expenses could help establish a right-of-way and relocate utilities for a future SkyTrain extension, this overall BRT approach could result in significant unnecessary sunk costs, along with additional inflationary expenses and years of delay stemming from the decision to defer inevitable SkyTrain investments on select key corridors due to the desire for a short-term political win within the local government level.

Even that perceived political win may ultimately backfire. The backlash from repurposing vehicle lanes for BRT could cost more political capital than the upfront challenges of committing to a fully grade-separated rail solution. In the long run, BRT carries a high risk of delivering a negative return on the substantial political capital required to forcefully push it through.

It also appears that BRT could take a bit longer to implement than previously suggested. In TransLink’s most recent BRT update earlier this year, it was noted that, after funding is secured, construction could still take up to five years to complete — about the same duration to build the Canada Line, Evergreen extension, Broadway extension or the Surrey-Langley extension.

So these questions must be asked: why push for a costly detour rather than a meaningful step toward permanent long-term rapid transit infrastructure? Why not do it right the first time with SkyTrain on key corridors where long-term demand clearly warrants it? Why not treat the hundreds of millions currently earmarked for BRT as a “down payment” of sorts — an initial investment toward making future SkyTrain projects shovel-ready when funding is made available?

In many cases, this would be a smarter use of limited public dollars, avoiding the costly cycle of building, tearing out, and rebuilding with brand-new high-capacity, heavy-duty infrastructure that will last for 100 years.

But perhaps it will take the rollout of a few initial BRT lines to reveal that expectations of what a nicer bus can do have probably been overstated — that BRT may not be suitable for application on all of its identified corridors in a rapidly growing and densifying region. TransLink has plans for up to nine BRT lines.

A more practical and cost-effective approach would be to expand and enhance the existing frequent, limited-stop RapidBus network as a transitional solution — one that helps build ridership along emerging corridors while laying the foundation for future rail rapid transit where, and when, it is truly warranted. This should also be coupled with more express bus route variations of busy local bus routes.

History shows that this leaner bus mode works very well.

The 97 B-Line paved the way for the Evergreen extension, the 98 B-Line was the precursor to the Canada Line, and the 99 B-Line not only led to the original Millennium Line, but continues to underpin both the Broadway extension now under construction and the planned future extension to UBC.

It’s time for SkyTrain to UBC

Here is what we know so far about what is happening with the UBC SkyTrain extension’s project planning.

In 2022, the provincial government assumed jurisdiction over the UBC SkyTrain extension from TransLink and is now leading the concept development, technical planning, and preparation of a business case — building on the previous preliminary work completed by the public transit authority.

SkyTrain still has its skeptics in some corners, but studies have consistently shown that street-level LRT’s capacity between Arbutus and UBC would fall short of meeting projected demand over the medium term, and the associated costs would still be significant.

Previous work by TransLink demonstrated very strong regional public support for a SkyTrain extension, and the City of Vancouver has formally endorsed advancing the project as a seamless continuation of the Millennium Line. This includes a route that takes the extension to the Jericho Lands high-density development.

In addition to providing an on-site station on the Jericho Lands, there would also be stations at West Broadway’s key intersections with Macdonald Street and Alma Street, and a station in the academic core of the UBC campus (in the vicinity of the intersection of the University Boulevard and East Mall, next to the UBC Nest Student Union Building). What appears to be up in the air is the precise route, and the alignment — the segments that are tunnelled, elevated, and/or at-grade, such as the possibility of building an elevated guideway along the median of University Boulevard between Blanca Street and Wesbrook Mall as a more cost-effective measure.

The provincial government’s business case and detailed technical planning work — including geotechnical studies involving borehole drilling — will cost about $40 million, with the federal government covering $14 million.

Between May and December 2024, geotechnical investigation crews contracted by the provincial government completed borehole drilling soil samples at 100-metre intervals along the entire extension route between Arbutus Street and UBC.

In January 2025, Premier David Eby’s mandate letter for Mike Farnworth, the B.C. minister of transportation and transit, included the key direction to “lead work to advance progress on the Broadway extension to UBC, including by working with the federal government, UBC, the City of Vancouver, First Nations, and all relevant government agency stakeholders.”

Also, in relation to this extension, Farnworth will work with the BC Minister of Housing and Municipal Affairs to “advance related government objectives on housing density and identify opportunities to achieve reduced carbon pollution and economic development.”

Years ago, UBC offered to provide land for stations and other infrastructure and a potential financial contribution toward the project. The First Nations owners for the Jericho Lands project are willing to provide land for the on-site station and temporary use of the property for construction staging and storage purposes.

The Alma Mater Society of UBC — the university’s student union — and Movement: Metro Vancouver Transit Riders have just launched an online petition in support of UBC SkyTrain. This petition is open to the general public, not just students.

Perhaps it is time to challenge our leaders to commit to beginning major construction on the UBC SkyTrain extension by 2030 — building on the momentum of the Surrey-Langley extension’s anticipated completion in late 2029.

You might also like:
• B.C. government completes first series of soil sample drilling for UBC SkyTrain planning
• BC government confirms UBC SkyTrain extension to be a key priority
• Broadway Subway stations begin to take shape for 2027 opening
• Opinion: Don't waste time and money on BRT or LRT, begin planning for North Shore-Metrotown SkyTrain
• Jericho Lands development passes new hurdle to help First Nations secure construction financing
• How many people will ride the Broadway Subway when it opens in 2027?
• How TransLink bus routes could change from Broadway subway opening